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1 Introduction
Economic relationships between Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and their
Western partners during the 1990s have been marked by the premises of EU enlargement.
In the early 1990s most CEE countries have formulated officially their desire to integrate the
Union, and have received an affirmative response conditional on the fulfillment of several
economic criteria. About a decade latter, they have acquired the membership status and
benefit from all insiders’ advantages. The evolution of their economic exchanges between
these two dates reflected a gradual elimination of trade costs, and a concentration of
trade with ‘old’ (core) EU partners. Regional integration between Eastern and Western
European nations has been accompanied by important trade creation effects, that continue
even after CEE countries have joined the European Union. Indeed, it takes time for firms to
grasp trading opportunities offered by the modified economic environment. The economic
literature employs the term trade potential to designate these effects.
The additional trade arising from an economic integration initiative is traditionally
estimated in the literature by trade potential models that rely on the empirical success of
the gravity equation. The essence of these models consists in comparing actual trade to the
gravity-predicted or so-called “normal” level of trade, with the difference between the two
capturing the trade potential. Wang and Winters (1991), Hamilton and Winters (1992),
Baldwin (1993), Gross and Gonciarz (1996), Fontagné et al. (1999), Nilsson (2000), and
Papazoglou et al. (2006) use this approach to estimate European trade potential during
the 1990s. One drawback of this method is the misspecification of the gravity equation
used in these models with respect to trade theory, and the sensitiveness of results upon the
gravity specification employed. Another weakness of trade potential models is that they
disregard the large amount of trade taking place inside national borders and base their
predictions on an analysis carried exclusively on international trade.
The present paper introduces a new method for measuring trade integration and quan-
tifying future increases in intra-regional trade. Differently from traditional trade potential
models, I define the level of trade integration of two or more countries by referring to their
domestic trade. The closer is the volume of trade between two countries to their domestic
trade, when controlling for standard variables such as supply, demand, and trade costs, the
more integrated are the two countries. In other words, I compute trade potentials from all
cross-border trade costs, taking into account domestic trade.
Technically, the method consists of two steps. Firstly, I estimate the level of cross-
border trade costs using each country’s domestic trade as benchmark for its trade with
partner countries. The rationale for this is the following: A country is a highly integrated
and homogeneous economic space, where full economic integration is achieved. Indeed, in
the light of some recent studies (e.g. Brunetti et al., 1997, Rauch, 2001), the presence of
a single legislative system, central administration, currency, communication network and
set of economic policies contributes to an important reduction of transaction costs and
fosters exchange. This argument is confirmed by empirical works revealing that higher
volumes of trade take place inside countries (i.e. within national borders) than between
them (i.e. across borders). McCallum (1995) refers to this as the border effect and finds
that even highly integrated countries as Canada and US trade about twenty times less with
each other than with themselves. Later work has proven this figure to be unrealistically
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high: e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) find a border effect ranging between 2.24
and 10.7 for the same countries. Still, domestic trade remains a convenient benchmark
for international trade flows. In this paper I make the assumption that trade costs other
than those induced by the distance are null for transactions taking place within the same
country, and express international trade costs in terms of border effects, i.e. the ratio of
international-to-domestic volume of trade.
Secondly, I compare international trade costs for the integrating and the reference group
of countries. The group of countries with the lowest level of intra-group trade costs serves
as reference for all other regional trade flows. I compute the level of trade integration or
trade potential as the ratio of estimated within- and cross-group border effects, with a lower
ratio corresponding to a higher level of trade integration. I choose the reference group to
be formed by countries with the lowest international trade costs and I assume that further
integration within the region reduces trade costs to the level observed for the reference
group. In the particular case of European integration, trade between the fifteen core-EU
members is subject to lower distortions and I use it as a reference for other European
flows, as in the literature on trade potentials. The fact that the share of intra-EU trade
in total EU trade remained at a steady level during the last two decades suggests that
the latter might well correspond to the long term equilibrium. The East-West European
trade creation may or not be accompanied by trade diversion in the detriment of intra-
CEE integration. After the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 trade between new member
states (NMS) became intra-EU trade, and trade costs associated with these flows should
also converge, at least in the long run, to the level of intra-EU costs prior to enlargement.
Another question tackled in this paper is that of the correct specification of the gravity
equation. Although gravity is shown to be compatible with both traditional and new trade
theories, each theoretical model produces a different final trade specification. This aspect,
ignored by trade potential models, is incorporated here through the use of theoretically
derived trade equations in the estimation of border effects. One can estimate border ef-
fects from a national product differentiation setting as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
with monopolistic competition and firm-specific varieties like Wei (1996) and Head and
Mayer (2000), or, yet, estimate an average bilateral border effect as Head and Ries (2001).
Accordingly, I use three alternative specifications for domestic and foreign trade flows. The
first approach consists in using country-specific effects to capture importer and exporter
groups of variables, allowing the estimation of coefficients on bilateral variables alone; the
second involves the incorporation of a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (DSK) monopolistic produc-
tion model; and the last approach implies the computation of average trade ‘freeness’.
Thus, the method presented in the current paper eliminates the two drawbacks char-
acterizing the traditional trade potential models mentioned above: (i) the use of border
specific costs permits to account for the fact that a lot of trade is already “missing” at
the international level, and (ii) the estimation of border effects with theoretically derived
trade equations corrects for specification problems. For the simplicity of the exposal I refer
hereafter to trade between old/core EU countries as intra-EU trade, to trade between NMS
that joined the EU in the last decade as intra-CEE trade, and to trade between the two
groups of countries as CEE-EU or East-West European trade. Thus, the CEE-EU trade
potential or trade integration is obtained as the ratio between the border effect estimated
for CEE-EU trade and for intra-EU trade.
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Trade of the twelve NMS, both with other NMS and with the fifteen core-EU countries
improved remarkably during the last decade of the twentieth century. The results predict
much higher trade potential values for CEE-EU and intra-CEE trade than usually found
in the literature with traditional trade potential models. Results are very robust, with
the three theoretically sound specifications producing the same conclusions. Thus, at the
beginning of the XXIst century trade between CEE and EU countries represented less than
half of its attainable level, suggesting a possible two to three fold increase with further EU
integration. The possible upsurge of intra-CEE trade in the following years, despite the
impressive reduction of bilateral border effects reached by the beginning of the century, is
even higher.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the new trade potential
measure introduced by this paper. Section 2 describes the theoretical trade model and three
different specifications used to estimate border effects. Border effect estimates within and
between country groups are presented and discussed in section 3. The main results of the
paper are displayed in section 4. Trade potentials for European trade flows produced by
the different approaches and their evolution in time are compared. Section 5 summarizes
the conclusions.
2 Theoretical Discussions
I start by describing an underlying preference structure for trade in differentiated goods.
The obtained trade equation includes variables that are unobserved or inaccurately mea-
sured, i.e. is unsuitable for direct estimations. To solve this issue I follow Combes et
al. (2005) and consider three different trade specifications.
A differentiated-goods trade structure
First, I consider a trade structure with a differentiated good and ni varieties produced in
each country i. The model has a slightly different interpretation depending on the used
data. Each industry (when using industry-level data) or the entire manufactured sector
(when using aggregate data) is considered to be composed of a single differentiated product
of which multiple varieties are available. Product differentiation can be at country or firm
level. National product differentiation was introduced by Armington (1969) who proposed
an utility function in which consumers distinguish products by their origin. It can also arise
from a Heckscher-Ohlin model with no factor price equalization as in Deardoff (1998). An
alternative approach is that of Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (DSK) type monopolistic competi-
tion models. In the latter each variety is produced by a distinct firm, and the number of
varieties ni (identical to the number of firms) is endogenously determined by the model.
Consumer preferences are homothetic and represented by a CES utility function. Im-
porting country j’s representative consumer utility is given by:
uj =
[∑
i
ni (aijxij)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(1)
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with aij representing country j consumers’ preference for country i products, xij the volume
of goods produced in i and consumed in j, and σ the substitution elasticity between any
two varieties. Coefficients aij are introduced in order to allow for different preferences
across countries.1
I assume that consumers of each product are charged with the same price augmented
by trade costs. The difference in the price of the same good in two different locations
is therefore entirely explained by the difference in trade costs to these locations. For
simplicity an ‘iceberg’ trade costs function is used. The price to country j consumers of
a good produced in i, pij, is the product of its mill price pi and the corresponding trade
cost tij. Two elements of bilateral trade costs are considered: transport costs proportional
to the shipping distance dij, and costs due to the presence of trade barriers such as tariffs,
non-tariff barriers, information costs, partner search costs, institutional costs, etc:
tij = dij
ρ︸︷︷︸ exp [(1− homeij) bij]︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (2)
transport border-specific
costs costs
The second type of costs arise exclusively for trade across national borders. homeij is a
dummy variable equal to one for internal trade and to zero for trade between countries.
[exp(bij)− 1]× 100 gives the tariff equivalent of border-specific trade barriers on country i
exports to j. In section 3 I introduce a more complex trade costs function by decomposing
the second left hand side term of equation (2) in order to account for the presence of a
common land border or language, and different trade flows types.
Consumers of each country j spend a total sum Ej on domestic and foreign products:∑
i
nixijpij = Ej, (3)
and choose quantities that maximize their utility function (1) under the budget constraint
(3). Country j’s total demand for country i products is given by:
mij ≡ xijpij = aσ−1ij
(
pitij
Pj
)1−σ
niEj, (4)
where Pj ≡
[∑
k
aσ−1kj (pktkj)
1−σ nk
] 1
1−σ
(5)
is a price index of the importing country j nonlinear with respect to the unknown pa-
rameter σ. The estimation of equations (4)-(5) is possible only for particular values of the
substitution elasticity σ. But even then the presence of a non linear price index Pj, and the
difficulty of measuring the number of varieties produced in each country limit the accuracy
1Two forms of preferences are usually found in the literature: identical for all countries, aij = ai ∀j,
yielding symmetric utility functions (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), and more pronounced for
domestic products, aij = exp(eij) if i 6= j and ajj = exp(ejj +β), producing asymmetric demand functions
(e.g. Bergstrand, 1989, Head and Mayer, 2000).
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of results. Slightly different specifications are reached with national and firm level product
differentiation.
I adopt the following notation φij ≡ (tij/aij)1−σ, imported from the economic geography
literature, and representing trade freeness (or φ-ness). Consumer preferences can also be
expressed as a function of bilateral variables, similar to trade costs. However, I have no
means to disentangle the impact of the same variable on preferences from its impact on
trade costs. Estimated coefficients on the latter will actually reflect the global effect on
both trade costs and consumer preferences. For exposal simplicity I assume throughout
the rest of the paper identical preferences for all products and consumers and interpret any
increase (drop) in trade freeness as a reduction (raise) of trade costs. The main implication
of this assumption is that our border effect measures will capture the trade gap arising from
stronger preferences of consumers for domestic goods, in addition to the effect induced by
larger costs for trading across cross-border.2 Alternatively, one could consider that an
identical equally-priced good from source country s is perceived differently by consumers
in country i and consumers in country j. A strong (weak) taste for good s leads consumers
to overvalue (undervalue) the virtues of the product and shifts their demand function
upward (downward). Thus, the actual price to which respond consumers in country j is
aσ−1sj psj rather than psj.
The rest of this section is reserved to the presentation and discussion of three alternative
specifications of bilateral trade flows. The first consists in using country-specific effects to
capture importer and exporter variables, allowing the estimation of coefficients on bilateral
variables alone. We shall refer to it as the fixed-effects approach. The second procedure
involves a deeper use of the theoretical framework, in particular the production side of a
DSK monopolistic model, and the last approach refers to the computation of an average
trade ‘freeness’. We call those the odds and friction specifications, respectively.
The fixed-effects specification
The method presented bellow relies uniquely on the differentiated-goods structure pre-
sented above. As a result, it holds independently of the specific market structure and the
production side assumptions, and is equally compatible with constant and increasing re-
turns to scale, national and firm level differentiation of products. As implied by the name,
it resides in using importer and exporter specific dummies to account for market and supply
capacities, as in Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Redding and Venables (2004).
An estimable trade specification can be derived directly from (4) by grouping i and j
terms of the equation, using the definition of trade freeness, and taking logarithms on both
sides:
lnmij = FEi + lnφij + FMj. (6)
Country fixed effects are used as proxies for supply and demand terms of the equation
with FEi ≡ ln(nip1−σi ), and FMj ≡ ln(EjP σ−1j ). Under this approach only bilateral
2The assumption of identical preferences does not alter the main conclusion of the paper. The aim of
the paper is to illustrate the integration between old and new EU countries over the past two decades.
While differences in consumer preferences may inflate the level of border effects estimated for each year,
they leave unaffected the evolution trend. Indeed, changes in tastes and consumption habits arise on much
longer time horizons than the one considered in the paper.
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variables are left in the equation, and all structural parameters, in particular the elasticity of
substitution between varieties σ, cannot be estimated. This represents the major drawback
of this approach.
Differently from the cited authors, I am interested in the estimation of border specific
effects and estimate equation (6) for international and domestic trade. Trade costs in φij
are decomposed according to (2) to reach the final trade specification:
lnmij = FEi + FMj + ρ(1− σ) ln dij + (1− σ)bij − (σ − 1)bijhomeij. (7)
Accordingly, a higher coefficient on the last variable designates higher cross-border barriers
for country i’s exports to j. As suggested by equation (7) higher trade barriers can arise
not only from larger trade costs (larger bij), but also from a higher elasticity of substitution.
The trade loss due to country-specific trade barriers (e.g. strong non-tariff barriers, poor
domestic institutions) is seized by country specific effects and not by the border effect.
Differently, one can first derive a gravity-type trade equation following Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003)’s approach for national product differentiation, and only afterwards
group supply and demand variables separately into country specific effects. This will
produce identical estimation equations and results; the difference lays in the interpretation
of country and partner effects FEi and FMj.
Summing bilateral imports (4) across destinations gives the production level at origin
yi. Then the obtained identity can be further used to express the unknown amount pi1−σ
(ni = 1, ∀i in this particular case), which is then re-introduced in the trade equation (4).
Differently from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), this can be accomplished without
imposing market clearance (yi = Ei) and using data on importer’s expenditure.3 A nice
gravity equation is thus obtained:4
mij =
yiEjφij
P¯ 1−σi P˜
1−σ
j
(8)
with P¯ 1−σi ≡
∑
k
φikPk
σ−1Ek, and P˜ 1−σj =
∑
k
p1−σk φkj. (9)
P˜j is an importer-specific price index reflecting the average price of country j’s imports.
A higher average price paid by consumers of the importing country increases the value
of exports to that market. P˜ 1−σj , on the contrary, corresponds to the relative isolation
of a country in terms of trade costs and/or consumer preferences, and reduces bilateral
flows. P¯i is an exporter-specific weighted average of price indexes of all its trading partners
including itself. The expression of P¯ 1−σi in (9) is very similar to the remote market access
3Market clearance is a quite restrictive assumption for it implies balanced international trade, which
occurs only at national level and in the long run. This assumption is not completely inconsistent with the
CEE-EU industry level pattern of trade. In 2000 80% of the trade between EU and CEE countries at the
industry level was intra-industry trade. Trade imbalances are less important for the entire manufactured
sector, but not sufficiently low to suggest that realistic predictions shall be obtained by assuming market
clearance at aggregate level. Therefore, I use expenditure data computed as the sum of domestic production
and foreign imports.
4Deardorff (1998) reaches a similar trade equation from a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model with differences
in factor prices across countries and complete specialization.
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used in economic geography models: the access of country i’s products to all markets,
including the domestic one. In other words, P¯i reflects the purchasing power of i’s partners
and is positively related to trade. An improved global market access for country i products
translates by higher total shipments to its partners. Symmetric trade costs (tij = tji, ∀ i, j),
and identical preferences across countries (aij = ai, ∀ i, j) yield the symmetric solution
P¯i = P˜i used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to reach a more elegant version of (8).
In our specific case of East-West European trade this assumption is irrelevant because the
two groups of countries followed uneven trade liberalization timetables, a difference that I
attempt to measure in the following sections.
Writing equation (8) in logarithmic form and using country and partner binary variables
to capture demand and supply terms5, I reach again equation (6).
The odds specification
This subsection presents an alternative trade model with monopolistic competition as in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980), increasing returns to scale and firm-level
differentiated products. Similar trade models have been developed by Head and Ries (2001)
and Head and Mayer (2000). In a DSK setting firms set prices as if they face a constant
price elasticity of demand, equal to the elasticity of substitution between two varieties σ.
Their prices, free of trade costs, are expressed as a constant markup over the marginal cost
of production ci:
pi = ci
σ
σ − 1 (10)
I consider labor as the unique factor of production and a single equilibrium wage level wi
within any given country i. Then a unique mill price is charged for all varieties produced
in the same country. Production technologies are assumed identical across countries and
wages are the only source of difference in production costs. Identical production functions
qpi = Fwi + µqwi are considered, with the first term on the right hand side expression
denoting fixed costs and the second term marginal costs, both expressed in units of labor.
Firms enter the market until all profits vanish away, and the equilibrium price equals the
average cost. This implies equal outputs q for all firms and varieties:
q =
F (σ − 1)
µ
, (11)
where F and µ represent invariable fixed and marginal costs in labor units. The number
of varieties produced and firms in each country, n, is endogenous to the model. Combining
equations (10) and (11), and using the fact that a country’s revenue yi is the sum of its
firms’ revenues, one can express the number of varieties produced by a country as follows:
ni =
yi
wiσF
. (12)
5FEi ≡ ln
(
yiP¯
σ−1
i
)
and FMj ≡ ln
(
Ej
∑
k p
1−σ1
k φkj
)
.
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Given the expression of the number of locally produced varieties, equation (4) rewrites to:
mij = p
1−σ
i
φij
P 1−σj
yiEj
σwiF
, (13)
with P 1−σj =
∑
k
p1−σk φkj
yk
σwiF
. (14)
Using relative demands as explained variables, i.e. the ratio of trade flows to the same
destination, considerably simplifies the specification by eliminating destination specific
right hand side terms. Applied to our trade equation (13) this means the elimination of
non linear importer’s price index and expenditure. Thus the set of explained variables
shrinks to the characteristics of the two origins. Particularly interesting for us is the case
when the destination country is taken as reference. With bilateral flows given by equation
(13), the foreign-to-internal trade ratio becomes:
mij
mjj
=
yi
yj
(
pi
pj
)1−σ
wj
wi
φij
φjj
. (15)
Note that assumptions on the production side imply that mill prices are equal to pi =
µwi(σ/(σ− 1)). The price ratio in (15), which can also be written as the ratio of marginal
costs, becomes equal to the wage ratio. Unknown technological F and µ coefficients simplify
when using relative demands.
Border specific costs can be estimated from equation (15) with destination country
as reference and the sample restricted to foreign-relative-to-domestic shipments (exclude
observations of the mjj/mjj type). Use the decomposition of trade costs (2) in (15) and
take logarithms to obtain the odds specification:
ln
mij
mjj
= ln
yi
yj
− σ ln wi
wj
+ ρ(1− σ) ln dij
djj
+ (1− σ)bij (16)
The opposite of the constant term in the above equation reflects border-specific trade
barriers. ‘Missing’ international trade is measured in terms of actual domestic trade, i.e.
as the ratio of domestic-to-cross-border trade deflated by relative production, wage and
distance. More specifically, the border effect for imports of j from i is obtained from (16)
by taking the exponential of the negative free term: exp[(σ − 1)bij].
If consumer preferences were to vary with the goods’ origin, any disproportionate pref-
erence for domestic varieties would be captured by the border effect. With a generally
accepted perception of positive domestic biases in preferences, one should expect larger
border effects estimates with the odds specification.
The friction specification
The last approach regards the use of a transformation of the explained variable introduced
by Head and Ries (2001). They use as left hand side variable the inverse index of ‘friction’
9
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to trade, defined as:
Φij =
(
mij
mjj
mji
mii
)1/2
(17)
It reflects the geometric mean of foreign firms’ success relative to domestic firms’ success in
each home market. Head and Ries (2001) assimilate the inverse of this index to the actual
border effect between Canada and the United States.
To stay consistent with the theoretical setup described in the beginning of this section,
trade flows in the expression of Φij are replaced using equation (4). Take logarithms on
both sides to obtain:
ln Φij = ln
(
φij
φjj
φji
φii
)1/2
(18)
Equation (18) can also be obtained following the same steps directly from (8) or even
(15). Its application is not therefore restricted to a specific market structure. According
to the above specification, index Φij actually represents the average trade freeness between
countries i and j relative to their internal freeness. In the light of economic geography
literature which assumes unitary internal freeness (null internal trade costs) and symmetric
trade costs, the inverse friction index Φij becomes precisely the trade freeness φij.
Note that equation (18) imposes unitary coefficients on production variables, as sug-
gested by the theory, and is therefore more in line with theoretical predictions than the
previous two approaches. However, it allows only for the estimation of the average border
effect for any two trading partners, rather than for two distinct effects, one for each trade
directions. Use the expression of trade costs (2) in the above equation to get:
ln Φij = ρ(1− σ) ln dij
(djjdii)
1/2
+ (1− σ)
(
bij + bji
2
)
(19)
Another advantage of the friction specification is that it removes the need of using even
origin specific variables, which is an important gain when accurate production, price and/or
wage data is not available. As previously, the constant term refers to the magnitude of
border effects when unitary trade friction observations are excluded. It captures as well any
bias in consumer preferences of both importing and exporting markets when preferences
are allowed to vary across countries.
Border effects under all specifications have two components: one reflecting the true level
of international trade costs (bij for the first two approaches and (bji+bij)/2 for friction), and
another coming from the elasticity of substitution between variables (σ − 1). This means
that even very small trade barriers may generate important deviations of trade towards
the domestic market when the substitution elasticity is sufficiently high. None of the
specifications presented in this section permits the estimation of all structural parameters.
Therefore, I can only estimate overall border effects with each approach, without being able
to distinguish the part ascribed to each of the two elements. In the fixed-effects specification
unilateral origin and destination trade costs are reflected in country and partner fixed
effects. The last two trade equations, therefore, might produce larger estimates of bij. In
the next section I proceed to the estimation of European border effects using the three trade
specifications introduced above and McCallum (1995)’s standard (atheoretical) gravity.
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3 Estimating Border Effects Across Europe
The method proposed in this paper computes trade potentials from border effects within
and between country groups. This section is dedicated to the estimation of border effects.
I divide trade between European countries into four types: EU imports from CEE, CEE
imports from EU, intra-EU trade, and intra-CEE trade, and estimate border effects for each
type of flows. I use a single equation on the entire sample of countries to estimate the four
border effects. This method is preferred to estimating border effects separately for each type
of trade since it has the advantage of imposing the same coefficients of independent variables
for all trade types and yields more comparable results. Border effects are estimated with
the fixed-effects, odds, and friction specifications presented in section 2. For comparison, I
estimate two additional specification: a simple gravity equation only on cross-border trade
flows within the sample, and a simple gravity equation on both domestic and foreign flows
as in McCallum (1995). Estimations are carried separately for total manufactured imports
and for industry level imports.
I introduce a more complex structure of trade costs by decomposing the last term of
equation (2) and allowing for differences across the type of trade and for countries sharing
a land border or speaking the same language:
ln tij = δ ln dij + b0homeij + b1CEEtowardsEUij + b2EUtowardsCEEij (20)
+b3intraEUij + b4intraCEEij + c1contigij + c2comlangij
As previously, homeij stands for domestic trade and b0 < 0. Dummies CEEtowardsEU ij,
EUtowardsCEEij, intraEU ij, intraCEEij indicate the affiliation of each observation to
a particular trade type. Variables contigij and comlangij denote respectively a common
land border and language for countries i and j. As both linguistic and neighbor relations
are likely to reduce trade costs, I expect coefficients c1 and c2 to be negative. Observe that
the first fixe dichotomic variables in the above trade costs specification sum to unity. The
use of (20) along with a constant term in a trade equation does not permit therefore the
estimation of all parameters. I choose to drop the variable homeij and use domestic trade
as reference for the estimation of coefficients b1 through b4. Thus, the constant term re-
flects the level of domestic trade and the other trade flows are expressed as deviations from
this level. In the odds and friction specification lower trade costs for domestic shipments
are directly accounted for by the specific form of the left hand side variable, and dummy
homeij becomes irrelevant.
I use a gravity equation similar to that of McCallumn (1995) as baseline:
lnmij = α0 + α1prodi + α2consj + α3dij + β1CEEtowardsEUij (21)
+β2EUtowardsCEEij + β3intraEUij + β4intraCEEij
+γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + ij
Exporter’s production prodi and importer’s consumption consj are used as proxies for
national revenues. The border effect for each type of trade is obtained as the exponential of
the absolute value of the corresponding coefficient. For example, exp(−β1) shows how much
more does in average a EU member state buy from itself than from other EU countries.
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I estimate equation (21) separately on international flows and on domestic and in-
ternational flows. In the first case variables homeij and intraEUij are dropped due to
collinearity with other dummies and trade flows are expressed as deviations from intra-EU
trade (captured by the constant term). This specification does not permit to estimate
border effects and serves only for comparison of other estimates. It is used in section 4 to
compute benchmark trade potentials since similar specifications are used in the traditional
trade potential literature.
The trade equation estimated with the fixed-effects procedure is obtained by integrating
the more detailed trade costs function (20) in equation (6). However, the use of all group
dummies, country and partner specific effects is impossible due to collinearity problems.
The inclusion of all country specific effects is imperative for the estimation of average
effects for the entire sample, not relative to an excluded country pair. But then variable
homeij can be obtained as a linear combination of other group, country, and partner
dummies. A tractable equation is reached by replacing the variables CEEtowardsEUij
and EUtowardsCEEij by their sum, CEEandEUij:
lnmij = FEi + FMj + α ln dij + β0 + β12CEEandEUij + β3intraEUij (22)
+β4intraCEEij + γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + εij
In this case one can estimate only an average border effect for CEE-EU trade: exp(−β12).
With lower relative trade costs for EU countries (b1 < b2), this method underestimates the
border effect for intra-EU trade and overestimates the effect for trade between NMS.
The odds trade specification is reached by combining equations (16) and (20):
ln
mij
mjj
= α1 ln
yi
yj
+ α2 ln
wi
wj
+ α3 ln
dij
djj
+ β0 + β1CEEtowardsEUij (23)
+β2EUtowardsCEEij + β3intraEUij + β4intraCEEij
+γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + υij
Relative production values are used for output or revenue ratios. Of all specifications
exposed in section 2, this is the only one that estimates distinct border effects for each of
the four European trade types.
The friction approach estimates average two-way trade within and between the two
groups of countries. Differently from the fixed-effects method, dummies for both CEE
exports to and imports from EU are included. By construction, the coefficients on these
variables are equal and reflect the average CEE-EU border effect. The equation estimated
with this approach is the following:
ln Φij = α ln
dij√
djjdii
+ β0 + β1CEEtowardsEUij + β2EUtowardsCEEij (24)
+β3intraEUij + β4intraCEEij + γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + vij
Coefficients β1 to β4 may also capture the share of consumer preferences common to all
countries of each group, including any particular preference for domestic products, common
to all EU countries, and respectively all NMS. The use of relative demands in the last
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two specifications introduces spatial autocorrelation in the error term. This is corrected
through a robust clustering procedure, which allows a correlation of residuals vij for the
same importing country j.
I estimate border effects for total manufactured bilateral imports of fifteen EU countries
and twelve Central and East European countries with pooled ordinary least squares and
year fixed effects and report results in table 1. Standard deviations are obtained with
a robust clustering technique that allows error terms for the same country pair to be
correlated. This permits to control at least partially for autocorrelation in the data. All
coefficients have the expected sign and most of them are statistically significant. Production
and consumption coefficients are close to unity and the distance elasticity of trade is not
very different from -1, similar to most empirical studies in the literature. The parameters
of interest are the coefficients on group (trade type) dichotomic variables. The fist column
shows estimates of international trade costs relative to intra-EU costs. Negative coefficients
of group dummies indicate that intra-EU trade is subject to lowest trade costs, justifying
its use as reference for other European trade flows. A core EU country exports on average
37% [= (1 − exp(−0.46)) × 100] less to a NMS than to another EU country, imports
40% [= (1− exp(−0.51))× 100] less from a NMS than from a EU partner, and two NMS
trade 43% [= (1 − exp(−0.57)) × 100] less than two core EU countries equally large and
distant. Border effect estimates obtained with equation (21) are presented in column 2.
Setting all group variables equal to zero yields an estimation of domestic trade and trade
costs for each type of international trade flows are obtained relative to this reference level.
Thus, intra-EU border effects or trade costs are 5.5 [= exp(1.71)] times larger than domestic
trade costs; EU exports to and imports from NMS are 9.0 [= exp(2.20)] and respectively
9.6 [= exp(2.26)] times more expensive than trading within national borders. Trade costs
between NMS from Central and Eastern Europe are the largest: 10.5 [= exp(2.35)] times
domestic costs. Hence, both CEE-EU and intra-CEE trade integration lies bellow the level
reached by the fifteen core-EU members.
The positive and significant coefficient on the common land border variable confirms
the intuition that neighbor countries trade more with each other. This can be due to lower
trade costs between these countries, as well as to more similar consumer preferences. The
non significant coefficient of the common language dummy is due to its high correlation
with the common border variable, the low number of dyads sharing both characteristics in
the sample, and their uneven distribution across country groups.6 Including internal trade
in estimations (column 2) keeps the coefficients on all variables almost unchanged (relative
to column 1), and sets forward the fact that both EU and CEE countries rely much more
on domestic than foreign partners.
Border effects of similar magnitude of are obtained with the other three trade specifi-
cations. The fixed-effects model (column 3) estimates that a EU member country buys on
average about 3.8 [= exp(1.34)] times more from itself than from another EU country, while
a similar NMS buys about 15.5 [= exp(2.74)] times more. Trade between EU and NMS
is less than half of the intra-EU trade, when controlling for market and supply capacities,
distance and common language and land border.
6Indeed, in Europe most countries that speak the same language share also a land border: e.g. Austria
and Germany, Belgium and its neighbors. Out of the 650 distinct country-partner relationships in the
panel only 20 speak a common language, and 14 of them are core EU countries.
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Table 1: European trade integration: total manufactured imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model : gravity gravity FE odds odds IV friction
Dependent variable: lnmij lnmij lnmij ln
mij
mjj
ln mijmjj Φij
ln production exporter 0.84a 0.83a
(0.03) (0.02)
ln consumption importer 0.74a 0.73a
(0.03) (0.02)
ln distance -1.09a -1.07a -1.11a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ln relative production 0.79a 1.00
(0.05)
ln relative wage -0.29b -0.43a
(0.11) (0.11)
ln relative distance -0.72a -0.88a
(0.15) (0.15)
ln average relative distance -0.90a
(0.05)
CEE exports to EU -0.51a -2.26a -3.36a -2.70a -2.70a
(0.09) (0.22) (0.36) (0.35) (0.13)
EU exports to CEE -0.46a -2.20a -2.89a -2.74a -2.70a
(0.08) (0.22) (0.46) (0.50) (0.13)
CEE-EU -2.17a
(0.22)
intra EU -1.71a -1.34a -2.22a -1.86a -1.81a
(0.23) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.12)
intra CEE -0.57a -2.35a -2.74a -3.61a -3.20a -3.15a
(0.12) (0.21) (0.25) (0.38) (0.37) (0.15)
common land frontier 0.31b 0.36a 0.36a 0.83a 0.61a 0.57a
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.12)
common official language 0.06 0.06 0.22 0.46b 0.49a 0.51b
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21)
N 8360 8701 9434 7987 7987 8317
R2 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.80 0.67 0.72
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 29.87
p-value 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The next two columns present results from the odds approach. Figures in column 4
correspond to estimates of equation (23) with generalized least squares; in column 5 I
correct for endogeneity induced by the simultaneous use of production and wage variables
and revealed by a significant Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic. I impose a unitary coefficient
14
Angela Cheptea Border Effects and European Integration
on relative production, in line with the theoretical model, and use per capita GDP, em-
ployment levels (size of labor force), and productivity as instruments for wages. Standard
errors take into account the correlation of the error terms for a given importer. This is
required by the specific form of the explained variable: the logarithm of the ratio between
a imports from a foreign source and domestic purchases. All estimates are statistically
significant at the 5% level. The low absolute value of the wage coefficient is due to the fact
that wages reflect quite poorly product prices.7 I obtain larger absolute values for wage and
distance coefficients when I correct the endogeneity bias. The use of instrumental variables
(IV) also induces a drop in European border effects, which approach the estimates of the
fixed-effects model. Column 4 results confirm the relationship between CEE-EU trade costs
in both directions established in columns 1 and 2: It costs less for EU countries to export
to CEE partners than for NMS from Central and Eastern Europe to export to old EU.
This difference vanishes with a IV estimator: CEE-EU trade in either direction is about
fifteen times more expensive than trade with a domestic partner. Core EU countries with
no common border or language trade with each other six times more than with themselves.
More similar tastes and/or larger transaction costs lead to a higher border effect estimate
for intra-CEE trade: 24.5 [= exp(3.20)].
The last column of table 1 displays the estimates of the friction specification. Bilateral
variables used to express trade costs are the only explanatory variables in this model.
By construction, error terms are not independent across observations, but are assumed
independent across importer-exporter couples. Estimates of border effects are very similar
to the ones in column 5. The last three columns also show an enhanced effect of the
common land border and confirm that countries that speak the same language face lower
trade costs. As expected, the odds and friction specifications generate larger border effects
than the fixed-effects and standard gravity models. This difference is explained by the fact
that in the fixed-effects approach importer and exporter dummies capture country-specific
trade costs as well as some of the variance in consumer preferences, while in the odds and
friction specifications they are attributed to border effects. Therefore, if one believes that
country-specific trade costs have are uniformly distributed and consumer preferences are
highly uneven, one should rely on estimates in column 3. Estimates from columns 5 and
6 should be preferred in the opposite case. To summarize, depending on the specification,
CEE-EU trade is on average 9 to 15 times inferior to domestic trade when keeping supply,
demand, and trade costs constant. This ratio is 2.4 times larger than for trade between
the old EU countries, but represents less than two-thirds of the similar ratio for intra-CEE
trade.
Border effect estimates obtained with industry level data are shown in table 2.8 When
trade is broken down by industries, an important number of zero value trade flows is
observed. The problem with nil trade flows is that they do not occur randomly, but are
the outcome of a selection procedure, e.g. a low supply or demand for a particular group
of products. To correct for this sample self-selection bias I give a positive weight to the
zero trade mass and employ a two-stage Heckman estimator: a first-stage probit model
and a second-stage pooled OLS model with year fixed effects. A statistically significant
7In reality the labor is not the unique factor of production and there are many additional distortions
in the price structure not captured by the model.
8Point estimates of all coefficients can be provided upon request.
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Table 2: European trade integration: border effects with industry-level data
Country pairs that do not share a common land border
and do not speak the same language
Trade flows gravity FE odds odds IV friction
CEE exports to EU 11.3 15.8 27.4 15.7 18.9
EU exoprts to CEE 10.1 15.8 11.2 7.6 18.9
Intra EU trade 3.8 6.4 6.6 4.2 6.6
Intra CEE trade 21.0 23.9 27.6 17.4 29.0
Country pairs that share a common land border
and speak the same language
Trade flows gravity FE odds odds IV friction
CEE exports to EU 6.0 6.5 7.7 5.5 6.5
EU exports to CEE 5.4 6.5 3.2 2.7 6.5
Intra EU trade 2.0 2.6 1.9 1.5 2.2
Intra CEE trade 11.2 9.8 7.8 6.1 10.0
Note: Border effects are computed using estimated coefficients of equations (21),
(22), (23) and (24) for each year with industry level data. Effects for
countries with no common land border or language are represented.
coefficient of Mills’ ratio in the second stage is obtained for the fixed-effects and odds
specifications, indicating the necessity of this adjustment. Compared to the results for
the aggregate manufactured sector, estimated coefficients are slightly lower for supply and
demand variables but larger in absolute terms for distance and common land border. The
positive and significant pro-trade effect of a common language spoken by the exporter and
the importer appears in all the three specifications compatible with the theoretical model.
Estimated border effects for all trade types and all specifications except the odds are
larger when industry level data are employed. This finding testifies that most European
trade liberalization was concentrated in a small number of large size industries. The use of
aggregate manufacturing data underestimates the amount of ‘missing’ international trade
because it disproportionately reflects large sectors with low barriers to trade. Lower border
effects with industry level data and the odds specification are due to the larger selection
bias. The odds specification uses domestic trade of the same importing country and in
the same industry as reference for international flows. Differently, in gravity and fixed-
effects models domestic trade of any country in the sample and any sector may serve as
reference after controlling for market supply, demand and trade costs. Therefore, industry
level border effects obtained with the odds method are more accurate. The preference over
results with the friction model is due to the fact that the odds specification allows for
different border effects for CEE exports to core EU and CEE imports from EU.
With industry data the gap between East-West European and intra-EU trade is very
prominent under both gravity and odds specifications, the only ones that separate the two
types of trade. However, the simple gravity produces erroneous results even when industry
level demand and supply data are used because it ignores remote resistance terms implied
by the theory, particular strong at the industry level. Different from the aggregate case,
with industry data the theoretically consistent odds specification shows that CEE exports
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to EU face higher trade barriers than flows in the opposite direction. This counterintuitive
result is robust to changes in the estimation procedure or country panel. The apparent
paradox can be explained by the fact that EU countries liberalized first their domestic
markets for small and medium size industries, and kept until late 1990s relatively important
barriers in several key CEE industries such as textiles and food products, while CEE
countries have adopted a distinct policy towards EU partners.
4 Trade Potential and East-West European Integration
The important steps undertaken by Eastern and Western European countries for the re-
moval of politically imposed distortions on bilateral exchanges at the beginning of 1990s,
as well as efforts engaged with the scheduled EU enlargement translated into a continuous
increase in trade between these countries. The drop in European cross-border trade costs
is well pictured by the evolution on regional border effects. Figure 1 show that border
effects for both CEE-EU and intra-EU trade reduced considerably from 1994 to 2007. This
conclusion is reached regardless of the trade specification employed. The odds specification
suggests that by the end of the period intra-EU trade costs were less than twice the level
of costs for domestic trade, while intra-CEE and CEE-EU trade costs where respectively
six and four times larger than this reference level. The reduction of trade costs continued
even after CEE countries integrated the European Union.
While strengthening trade between old and new members, EU enlargement affected
as well trade between NMS. According to the literature (Maurel, 1998, Gros and Gon-
ciarz, 1996, Baldwin, 1993, Nilson, 2000), the reintegration of CEE countries into the
world economy in the early 1990s was accompanied by their disengagement from intra-
CEE integration. The decline of trade with other CEE partners was beyond its normal
level, pointing out the strong competition between former socialist economies for obtaining
a higher share of the larger and more attractive core-EU market, and for increasing their
chances for accession. With most of CEE countries joining the union, this rivalry has been
significantly reduced, and intra-CEE trade has regained attraction. Indeed, as shown in
figure 1, intra-CEE border effects dropped by over thirty points from 1994 to 2007.
The reintegration of Central and Eastern European countries in the world economy
after the collapse of the communist system was accompanied by the reorientation of their
foreign trade towards the European Union. The important drop in CEE-EU border effects
in figure 1, especially for CEE exports to core EU countries, reflects this reinforcement of
regional integration in Europe.
With the EU enlargement to the East, the convergence of countries from Central and
Eastern Europe towards the EU market is expected to arise in all economic areas, including
the manner to trade. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that in the perspective the
proportion of purchases of domestic relative to foreign products of CEE countries will ap-
proach that of the fifteen core EU members. Indeed, intra-EU trade integration remained
almost unchanged (figure 1), advocating its use as reference for other regional trade flows.
In other words, I assume that in the long run both CEE-EU and intra-CEE trade inte-
gration will reach the intra-EU level. Therefore, I compute the level of trade integration
across Europe and further increase of these flows (trade potentials) by comparing the trade
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Figure 1: European trade integration: border effects
The fixed-effects specification
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Note: Border effects are computed using estimated coefficients of equations (22), (23) and (24) for
each year with industry level data. Effects for countries with no common land border or
language are represented.
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costs associated with each trade type to intra-EU costs. I define the potential of CEE-EU
and intra-EU trade as the ratio of the corresponding border effects:
CEE-EU trade potential =
CEE-EU border effect
intra-EU border effect
, (25)
intra-CEE trade potential =
intra-CEE border effect
intra-EU border effect
. (26)
Trade potentials obtained in this way reflect a trade integration in terms of border
effects. This kind of integration reaches its peak when the two groups of countries have
identical cross-border trade costs and preferences. I compute trade potentials using equa-
tions (25) and (26) and border effect estimates obtained with each of the four trade spec-
ifications employed in section 3. Whenever possible, separate border effects for each type
of trade (CEE exports to and imports from the EU, and intra-CEE trade) are computed.
Average East-West European trade potential for flows in both directions are estimated
using a single dummy for CEE-EU trade.
For comparison, I also compute trade potentials using the traditional methods employed
in the literature and display the results in table 3. For comparability, I use again trade
flows between the old EU countries as reference. Unlike the border effect ratio method
presented above, traditional trade potential models rely exclusively on cross-border flows.
Therefore I estimate equation (21) on the sub-panel of international trade and use the
resulting coefficients to compare CEE-EU and respectively intra-EU trade with the level
of intra-EU trade. A fist method, that I call gravity 1, consists in expressing CEE-EU
and intra-EU trade flows as percentage of intra-EU flows and attribute the difference up
to 100% to the trade potential. Alternatively, gravity 2 computes trade potentials as the
difference between the level of trade predicted by equation (21) and actual trade. Finally,
in line with the literature on trade potential,9 with gravity 3 I estimate (21) for trade of the
reference group, intra-EU trade in our case and use obtained coefficients along with data
on production, consumption, bilateral distance, and bilateral linkages (common language
and land border) to predict the ‘normal’ level of trade for the rest of flows. The difference
between actual and predicted (or ‘normal’) trade levels gives the potential of trade. Results
with all three methods for the first and last year in the panel are displayed in the upper
part of table 3. Trade potentials obtained with the innovative approach introduced in this
paper are shown in the last part of table 3. The four rows correspond to the different trade
specifications used to estimate European border effects.
A first conclusion that stems from table 3 is that traditional methods employed in
the literature, gravity 1, gravity 2 and gravity 3, yield small trade potentials. For all
types of trade flows these values are considerably lower than trade potentials obtained
with the border effects ratio method. Thus, traditional methods overestimate the level of
trade integration in the region. For exampl, according to gravity 1, in 1994 CEE-EU trade
represented only 12% of the level of intra-EU trade for comparable countries, corresponding
to a trade potential of 88%. Meanwhile, the ratio of border effects produces a trade
potential four times larger. Gravity 2 and gravity 3 find small and non-significant variations
9Wang and Winters (1991), Hamilton and Winters (1992), Baldwin (1993), Gross and Gonciarz (1996),
Fontagné et al. (1999), and Nilsson (2000).
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Table 3: European Trade Potential (in % of actual trade)
Type of trade flows
Method CEE to EU EU to CEE CEE-EU intra-CEE
1994 2007 1994 2007 1994 2007 1994 2007
Traditional trade potential models with international trade flows only
gravity 1 ∗ 78 64 76 50 77 58 88 77
gravity 2 † 44 48 52 56 48 52 51 52
gravity 3 ‡ 45 44 53 52 49 48 50 48
Border effects ratio method: equations (25) and (26)
McCallum (1995) gravity 420 253 399 192 409 221 735 388
fixed-effects specification 334 152 449 191
odds specification 535 232 204 186 335 209 590 314
friction specification 362 219 520 339
Note: Trade potentials are computed with industry level data:
∗ as exponential values of estimated group dummies;
† as the difference between actual and normal trade;
‡ as the difference between actual and normal trade, using intra-EU trade as reference.
in the CEE-EU and intra-CEE trade integration from 1994 to 2007. With trade potentials
computed as the difference between gravity-predicted (‘normal’) and actual volumes of
trade, flows between old and new member states and flows within the NMS group in any
year during this period are estimated at found to be only 50% under their potential level.
In addition, these models predict slightly larger trade barriers for EU exports to CEE
countries than for flows in the opposite direction, a finding contrary to results obtained
with the other approaches.
When GDP and population data are used instead of industry-level production and con-
sumption in equation (21), a simplification frequently adopted in the traditional literature,
trade potentials predicted by traditional models are even lower (results not displayed).
With these adjustments I find that East-West trade integration, if present, was very slow
or only marginal. In half of the cases the trade potential for CEE-EU flows increased over
the studied period, which comes at odds with the evolution of the regions’ economic and
political environment. As for intra-CEE trade, this approach does not predict a increased
regional integration, but rather a growing reticence of CEE countries to exchange mutually.
The new method for measuring trade potentials introduced above produces similar val-
ues with border effects estimated by fixed-effects, odds and friction specifications. This
approach situates East-West trade potential in 2007 between 152% and 219%. Depending
on the trade specification, during the considered period CEE-EU trade regained between
35% and 48% of its 1994 potential. The odds specification is the only to produce differ-
entiated results by flows’ direction. For all years in the sample the model exhibits CEE
exports to EU more distant from their potential than opposite flows. This matches the
finding pf lower access of products from Eastern Europe to Western EU markets from the
previous section.
According to all three approaches NMS traded very few with each other in the early
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1990s. In 1994 regional intra-CEE trade amounted to 15-18% of its potential level. Re-
gardless of the border effects estimates used to compute trade potentials in table 3, I find
an important increase of the intra-CEE integration. This reflects the drastic reorientation
of foreign trade of these countries in the first years following the collapse of the socialist
system. Advances in the process of transition and the development of regional economic
agreements (CEFTA, the Free Trade Agreement of Baltic states) encouraged regional trade,
which augmented enormously in terms of its potential. Lower trade potentials under the
fixed-effects specification, compared to odds and friction specifications, are caused by im-
portant country specific trade costs encountered by CEE partners (e.g. poor institutions
or transport systems) captured by country dummies.
One can also note that using a specification compatible with trade theory is also impor-
tant. Indeed, considerably larger trade potentials are obtained when one uses border effects
estimated with traditional gravity: over 700% for intra-CEE trade with McCallum (1995)
gravity compared to only 450% with the fixed-effects specification. This difference in results
reminds that atheoretical models are subject to non-negligible biases.
The large difference in trade potentials between the upper and lower part of table 3
comes from the use of different criteria for evaluating trade integration. Traditional trade
potential models ignore domestic trade and assign ‘normal’ trade to the prediction of the
gravity equation. The method introduced in this paper compares directly trade costs arising
in East-West European and intra-CEE transactions to costs existing between EU trade
partners. Trade within the domestic market is used as benchmark for the very estimation
of these costs. Thus, our method accounts for the discrepancy between domestic and
cross-border trade integration. It is important to signal that not all ‘missing’ international
trade is attributed to the trade potential, but only the proportion which corresponds to
the difference in trade impediments for specific types of flows. Regional integration is
evaluated here in terms of trade costs, expected to converge to the lower intra-EU level.
This uniformization of costs will result in increased trade with more distant partners and
weaker concentration of trade in the immediate neighborhood.
Larger potentials obtained with the new method confirm the necessity to account for
domestic trade in predicting the trade creation effects of regional integration. The dis-
regard of internal trade opportunities is likely to largely underestimate trade potentials.
Our method has the advantage of accounting for total international barriers to trade and
therefore produces results more in compliance with integration efforts made by countries.
Globally, the access of CEE goods to the old EU markets improved considerably during
from 1994 to 2007, and a large part of the potential European trade creation was already
accomplished. Nevertheless, by the year 2007 the left CEE-EU trade potential was signifi-
cantly larger than actual trade, implying more than a twofold possible increase of trade in
the years to follow.
In table 4 of the Appendix A I show industry-level effects on trade of European integra-
tion with the fixed-effects, odds and friction specifications.10 The first six columns refer to
trade potentials in 1994, and the last six for the year 2007. The first thing to notice is that
with a few exceptions trade creation effects are observed for all industries, both CEE-EU
and intra-EU trade, and under all specifications. The largest trade creation for both two-
10The term European integration is used for all 26 European countries considered in this paper. This is
different from its wide but inaccurate employment in the literature to designate only EU integration.
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way East-West European trade and intra-CEE trade was observed for rubber products and
electrical machinery. Non-electrical machinery and iron and steel products also enjoyed im-
portant trade creation. Trade between NMS increased largely in industrial chemicals and
textiles. The lowest trade integration is found in the tobacco industry, subject to specific
domestic regulations especially in core EU countries. In the case of intra-CEE trade, how-
ever, this is due to the fact that trade in tobacco production between CEE countries was
below its potential level even in 1994. For other chemical products and wearing apparel
European trade has even lost some of its potential. This can be explained by the increased
competition in these industries with products from emerging Asian countries and in partic-
ular China. Moderate effects on trade are obtained for the rest of industries. By the year
2007 CEE-EU trade remains largely inferior to its potential (less than one third) only in
seven: food products, beverages, tobacco, chemicals, iron and steel industries, professional
and scientific and measuring and controlling equipment, leather products and printing and
publishing. As expected, their number is larger for intra-CEE trade.
The reduction of both trade barriers and trade potentials for CEE-EU trade coincided
with an even more impressive evolution for trade between NMS. These results disseminate
the fears formulated by politicians and some authors that that CEE-EU trade integration
will be accompanied by a lower commitment of CEE countries to regional integration,
reflected by larger intra-CEE border effects and trade potentials at the beginning of the
period. Still, figures in table 3 show that manufactured trade between CEE countries may
expand to as much as two to three times the actual volume.
5 Conclusions
Trade both between CEE and between CEE and EU countries improved remarkably during
the last two decades, both in terms of border effects and trade potentials. The paper
shows that there is still place for important growth in bilateral CEE-EU transactions.
This result contradicts with most trade potential gravity models that claim that East-
West European trade has already reached its highest integration level. Much higher trade
potentials for both CEE-EU and intra-CEE trade are obtained when one controls for the
amount of trade within national borders. Results are very robust and are confirmed by
three different theoretically compatible trade specifications used. Thus, at the beginning
of the twenty-first century trade between CEE and EU countries represented less than
half of its attainable level, suggesting a possible 150% to 200% increase with further EU
integration. As for trade between NMS, its potential ranges depending on the model
between 190% and 340%, despite the strong reduction of bilateral border effects between
these countries achieved during the 1990s.
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A Data and additional results
The empirical application of theoretically derived trade equations encounters both data
availability and comparability problems. The use of different classifications, definitions
and registration criteria even for such standard economic variables as production and trade
may represent an additional source of errors and biases in results. The latter are yet more
pronounced in the estimation of border effects when internal trade volumes are computed
as the difference between national production and total exports in absence of regional data.
The present study carries over a sample of 27 countries: fifteen core EU members with
Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated under a single observation, and twelve Central and
East European countries, and a fourteen-year period from 1994 to 2007. Of the twelve
CEE countries of the panel ten have joined the EU in May 2004 and two in January 2007.
Two levels of aggregation are considered: total manufacturing industry, and 26 product
industries according to the ISIC Rev.2 classification.
Data on total manufactured bilateral imports is obtained from the BACI database of
Cepii. GDP in current US dollars are from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank) database. Total manufacturing and industry-level production, wages, labor force
and expenditure are from Eurostat and Trade and Production database of UNIDO (World
Bank). Missing Eurostat data are complemented with UNIDO data. In order to ensure
compatibility of different data sources, data has been adjusted by applying a conversion
rate equal to the average ratio of the value from the base source and the value from the
secondary source, and estimated separately for each country on observations present in both
databases. Industry-level expenditures are computed as the sum of demand for domestic
goods and imports from all trading partners.
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